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Standards and, more broadly, organizational rules are a key topic in the organizational 
literature. Since these are meant to be tools to improve the efficiency of individual and 
collective contributions to the achievement of an organization’s goals, organizational scholars 
have been interested for a long time in the study of the process of their development as well as 
of their actual impact (see for example Selznick, 1949; Gouldner, 1954). And indeed, 
analogies between some of their questionings and results of empirical studies – conducted in 
areas other than in the healthcare sector – and those of science studies on medical guidelines 
may be identified. 
First, the results of organizational studies contradict some assumptions (or threats) on the 
power of standards or organizational norms to make organizations function uniformly and 
they even underline that their adaptation to the specificities of every organization is a pre-
requisite for their successful diffusion (Segrestin, 1997; Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000). This is 
compatible with well-known results about the incapacity of guidelines to hinder practice 
variations and about the necessity of local negotiations and adaptation processes to everyday 
care practices and institutionalized patterns (Timmermans & Berg, 1997; Zuiderent-Jerak, 
2007). Second, organizational studies conclude that the introduction of standards does not 
always benefit the categories of actors who are in charge of the supervisory activities or, say, 
the regulators (Segrestin, 1996; Cochoy et al., 1998; Castel & Merle, 2002). This of course 
may echo back to empirical studies which underplay the risks of “deprofessionalization” 
through the development of medical standards (Berg et al., 2000; Timmermans & Kolker, 
2004; Weisz, 2005). Third, organizational-oriented studies (Segrestin, 1997; Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2000) as well as STS studies (Berg, 1997; Bourret, 2005; Cambrosio et al., 2006) 
have analyzed standards as potentially useful coordinative devices. 
However, beside these convergences, the organizational approach and some of its key 
concepts may enlighten aspects of the dynamics of medical guidelines, which to my 
knowledge have received only scant attention thus far. Drawing from the seminal works by 
Weber, organizational scholars showed that collective action is problematic, notably because 
actors pursue their own and often non-convergent interests, and that power is a given dynamic 
in relations between actors placed in a context of strategic interdependence (Emerson, 1962; 
Crozier, 1965; Crozier & Friedberg, 1980; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This approach leads to 
an emphasis on the ‘strategic interactions among a set of actors placed in a given field of 
action and mutually dependent for the solution of some common “problem”’ (Crozier & 
Friedberg, 1995). Taking the French oncology sector as a case study, I will show that 
guidelines are used strategically by individual physicians and groups of physicians. This 
framework has thus two heuristic consequences. First, it reveals another force propelling the 
development of guidelines. While some studies made convincing arguments about the rise of 
guidelines as a result of analyses by some medical researchers that the practices of physicians 
hardly correspond to medical science (Berg, 1995; Daly, 1995) or as one of the manifestations 
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of a new type of objectivity, ‘regulatory objectivity’ (Cambrosio et al., 2006), in the medical 
domain, the case of French oncology shows evidence that the proliferation of medical 
guidelines is also the result of an attempt by some physicians to improve their position 
relative to competing groups. Second, it points to other kinds of changes which guidelines 
may involve, beyond medical practices and coordination: the evolution of the structure of 
power relationships inside the medical profession. This point reinforces the argument made by 
science studies that, paradoxically, standardization does not eliminate the diversity of 
practices among physicians, even if it may sometimes transform them. 
 
Material and Methods 
 
This paper is based on fieldwork undertaken since 1999 which consists of several case studies 
aimed at understanding some developments of the organization of cancer care in France, and 
in particular the trend to rationalize medical work. 
Four main types of healthcare organizations are in charge of cancer care in France. Created in 
the 1920s, French comprehensive cancer centers (Centres de Lutte Contre le Cancer; CLCCs) 
are 20 autonomous private hospitals publicly funded. Each one is directed by a physician. The 
CLCCs manage research activities and treat patients at the same time in their respective 
regions. The National Federation of CLCCs (FNCLCC), whose board is composed of the 20 
directors, was created in 1964: conceived at first as an employers’ association, its role has 
enlarged to comprise the facilitation of collaborative scientific projects between CLCCs. 
Public teaching hospitals were created in 1958. The Hospital Reform Act was passed to 
modernize the French hospital system by linking regional public hospitals to university 
medical schools (see Jamous & Peloille, 1970). Public teaching hospitals have become the 
keystone of the French healthcare system, since they are expected to offer the best and most 
advanced treatments, to train physicians and to conduct medical research for all pathologies. 
Last but not least, general hospitals and private clinics participate in cancer care by providing 
diagnostics and/or treatments in surgery, radiotherapy and/or chemotherapy. 
Fieldwork was carried out in six different settings: at the national level, within the FNCLCC, 
which is the main producer of cancer guidelines in France, and in five French administrative 
regions. 
• Fieldwork at the national level (1999-2002) focused on the genesis and the main goals 
assigned to the federal guidelines project. Data was obtained from daily informal 
exchanges and semi-directive interviews with the main federal actors in charge of the 
project and with directors. I also had access to working documents and the proceedings 
of meetings where the scope of the project was discussed, decided and (re)defined. 
• At the regional level, interviews were conducted with representatives of regulatory 
bodies, directors of hospitals and physicians. Nearly 300 semi-directive interviews have 
been conducted so far (1999-2004). In a specific region, I was able for three years 
(2002-2004) to observe collective decisions-making processes about how guidelines 
were negotiated and validated. I had also the opportunity to observe the therapeutic 
decision-making processes (N 450) of four medical staffs. It was an opportunity to 
observe the manner in which guidelines were referred to when physicians had to define 
a therapeutic strategy for actual patients. 
 
A non-unified process led by professional organizations 
 
A professional initiative 
 
 
Early attempts to institutionalize the production and use of guidelines in the French healthcare 
system can be placed at the turn of the 1990s. In 1987, a national agency was created to 
develop medical evaluation, but its actual results had been rather modest. The 1991 Health 
Law underlined once again the importance of evaluation (including the evaluation of medical 
practices) in the healthcare sector, but this did not lead to any significant change either. In 
fact, the first national standards procedures occurred in 1993. These norms, however, aimed at 
forbidding dangerous and costly practices rather than promoting the best ones (Kerleau, 
1998). Furthermore, cancer care was not influenced by these public guidelines. The first 
French recommendation regarding cancer was published in 1993 by a medical society (the 
French Society of Mammography and Breast Pathology) and dealt with quality criteria in 
mass screening for breast cancer – i.e. a diagnostic procedure. 
But from then on, cancer centers took the lead in developing cancer guidelines in France. In 
1993, the board of the FNCLCC mandated some of their peers to launch a project aimed at 
‘harmonizing clinical practices between cancer centers, concerning diagnostic, classification, 
treatment and follow-up procedures’ (Annual Report of the FNCLCC, 1994; author’s 
translation). The selected methodology to elaborate these guidelines was initially a consensus 
conference. But a trip to the United States, where the project leaders visited some prestigious 
U.S. medical institutions, changed their mind: guidelines should rather be based on a critical 
review of medical literature in order to limit the impact of subjective opinions by the most 
reputed physicians and consequently to ‘objectify’ these guidelines. This project was thus 
explicitly conceived as a part of the emerging evidence-based medicine. From this point 
onwards, the scope of the project also changed its aim to not only defining the best practices 
for CLCCs but for the entire sector. 
Methodologists were recruited by the Federation. They were public health physicians who 
were trained to review the literature and to evaluate whether the final guidelines were 
congruent with this literature or not. They were meant to argue against physicians if the latter 
were prone to develop guidelines according to their own experience or first results of the 
latest clinical trials rather than to a systematic review of the literature. 
In addition to the methodologists, the project’s leaders planned from the start to involve as 
many cancer center physicians as possible in the elaboration of guidelines. From their point of 
view, this strategy presented some assets: first (and quite obviously), these physicians (about 
1000 physicians) represented a skilled labor force; secondly, their participation was conceived 
as a way to train them to learn and practice evidence-based medicine and to facilitate the 
acceptation and appropriation of guidelines. By the end of 1994, 300 cancer center physicians 
had already participated either in the task groups (which elaborated the clinical practice 
guidelines) or in the feedback process (consisting of comments on the first versions of the 
guidelines). Six hundred physicians had taken part in the project by 1998. The first 
documents, called ‘Standards, Options and Recommendations’ (SOR), were produced in 
1995, consisting of long monographs (around 200 pages) and of summaries published by the 
main French cancer journal Bulletin du cancer1. 
 
Collaboration and competition 
 
Beginning with the publication of the first SORs, the National Federation has involved more 
and more people working outside the CLCCs. At first, in 1995, an advisory board was created 
in addition to the executive committee, which was exclusively composed of 5 directors. In 
1996, the executive committee welcomed one more CLCC physician, 2 representatives of 
medical societies (pediatric oncology and gynecologic oncology) and 4 physicians who 
practiced outside CLCC. The advisory board grew to 74 members. To finish, it was decided in 
1997 to create a scientific board, exclusively composed of people working outside CLCC. 
 
Until recently, more than half of physicians who have been involved in the elaboration of 
guidelines or in the feed-back process worked outside CLCC. Since 1998, the FNCLCC has 
published 29 clinical practice guidelines in collaboration with a medical society (see table 1). 
 
Medical society Number of guidelines
French Dermatology Society 2 
French Society of Pediatric 
Oncology 6 
French Federation of Digestive 
Oncology 2 
French Society of Gynecologic 
Oncology 4 
Society for the Study and the 
treatment of Pain 5 
French Society of Pneumology 2 
Study Group of Lymphomas 2 
Others2 6 
 29 
Table 1: Participation of medical societies in FNCLCC’s guidelines 
 
Despite this alliance with other actors or institutions, the FNCLCC still manages the process 
and keeps the label ‘Standards, Options and Recommendations’ and the (legal) responsibility 
for its guidelines.  
It is responsible for 81 out of 148 French clinical practice guidelines (54%) which have been 
published so far (see graph 1). Furthermore, FNCLCC’s guidelines have been published in the 
British Journal of Cancer, one of the most reputed journals in Europe. FNCLCC is the only 
French organization whose cancer guidelines are diffused outside France. The SORs are 
approved by the State and medical audits conducted by the Social Insurance used them as 
reference. 
Other French producers of guidelines are the medical societies. They have published 46 sets 
of guidelines since 1997. Like the FNCLCC, their guidelines concern the management of 
specific cancers. Among them; the French Association of Urology (14 published guidelines - 
9%), the French Society of Hematology (9 guidelines) and the French Federation of Digestive 
Oncology (6 guidelines) are the most productive. Other medical societies published only 1 
guideline during this period. 
Guidelines by the National Agency are of a different kind: they correspond either to 
recommendations for prevention and screening procedures, the evaluation of new techniques, 












Graph 1: French cancer guidelines’ producers 
 
Diversity of the implementation processes at the regional level 
 
A recent study funded by the French National Cancer Institute confirmed the results of two 
previous surveys conducted by the FNCLCC: SOR guidelines are generally considered by 
physicians as the most reliable ones in oncology. However, among these physicians, those 
who worked in CLCCs and physicians who devoted more than half of their activity to cancer 
patients, were the ones who declared more familiarity with them and utilized them more 
frequently. 
Nonetheless, they are not considered as tools for everyday practice, except by a few 
practitioners who work inside teaching hospitals or cancer centers. Cancer centers thus 
created voluntary and cooperative networks for the elaboration and implementation of 
regional treatment protocols adapted to the characteristics and resources of the local 
healthcare system in order to be relevant and handy for everyday practice. This entails 
initiating and monitoring the discussion process at the regional level through which federal 
review monographs are in fact transformed into decision-making algorithms and into specific 
recommendations of one among several scientifically appropriate treatments. In some regions, 
the cancer center created a network without involving the regional teaching hospital. As a 
result, these teaching hospitals organized opposing networks. 
Besides these regional networks, some physicians who were specialized in the treatment of 
specific organs – and mainly urologists, gastroenterologists, visceral surgeon, lung specialists, 
and hematologists – declared that they used the guidelines of medical societies rather than the 
SORs. 
 
Development of guidelines as a collective strategy for intra-professional legitimacy 
 
 
The specific dynamics of this movement – its initial impulse and the diversity of involved 
organizations at the national and regional levels – is tributary to the specific organization of 
cancer care in France. In particular, the rivalry and competition between specialties 
(pathology-centered specialists vs. organ-centered specialists) and between hospitals 
influenced this development. 
 
The reinstatement of cancer centers as dominant actors through the development of 
guidelines 
 
The traditional collective identity of French Cancer Centers and the evolution of their position 
in the French oncology sector explain why their physicians first became involved in the 
development and diffusion of guidelines. Indeed, these guidelines have been considered as a 
tool to reinstate themselves as scientific leaders in the sector and as partners for other 
physicians. This project was the key-stone of an ambitious reform program conducted by the 
FNCLCC. This program, which consisted also of the development of research activities, an 
accreditation program and the negotiation of new professional statutes for employees, was a 
direct response to increasing competition for the CLCCs and to critiques by other stakeholders 
of the sector (Castel & Friedberg, 2004). 
In 1993, the instigator of the project was a pediatric oncologist, the director of a cancer center 
located in a very competitive region. His motives to develop guidelines were fourfold. First, 
the implementation of state-of-the-art practices in every hospital was a goal that he shared 
with his American peers (see Daly, 2005; Berg, 1995) and he could have been qualified, using 
Marks’ expression, as a ‘therapeutic reformer’ (Marks, 1997). Indeed, he could not abide by 
the heterogeneity among treatments which were prescribed by physicians in his center, since 
they could imply the unequal treatment of patients. He was all the more sensitive to this issue 
in that the international community of pediatric oncologists had already been involved for 
many years in the question of the harmonization of their practices (Castel & Dalgalarrondo, 
2005). Secondly, and furthermore, he analyzed that this heterogeneity was an obstacle to the 
regional legitimacy of his center. Indeed, because of this heterogeneity, physicians of other 
hospitals could put in doubt the quality of the advice that CLCC physicians offered them. 
 
There have been two initial reasons to launch this project. The first one is an inner one. 
We, as pediatric oncologists, treated lymphoma with a specific protocol and we saved 
75% of the children. In another service, physicians treated adults with lymphoma with 
another protocol and saved only 25% of patients. Thus, the poor patient was 25% likely to 
survive, if he was over 16, whereas children under 16 were 75% likely to survive. And I 
did not judge it justifiable that patients be treated differently from one service to another. 
(...) The second reason is an anecdote. Dr X [a head of service in a big public general 
hospital] called me once and told me: ‘I called your center to ask if it was possible to 
prescribe birth-control pills to a woman with breast cancer and I had three different 
answers.’ Then, he told me: ‘As long as you won’t be able to agree with each other – or at 
least to argue why you disagree – we will not consider you as the leading hospital.’ 
(Interview with the director of the cancer center, 1999; author’s translation) 
 
Thirdly, this director hoped the development of guidelines could be used to reshape (and 
improve) the relationships between his center and other general hospitals. His center should 
appear to other hospitals as a facilitator to treat the more frequent cancers and as a scientific 
reference which could help them to treat more complex and rare cancers or to which they 
could even refer patients for enrolling into clinical trials or for specific care. 
 
 
Physicians who work in other hospitals want us to let them develop their business. (…) 
Our answer is the thesaurus [i.e. the treatments protocols], outside consultations (…); it is 
an openness which leads us to advise a treatment for patients we do not necessarily see. It 
is an evolution you know well. (Discourse in front of the medical Board of the cancer 
center, 1993; author’s translation) 
 
Last but not least, he expressed in the same discourse that guidelines might be an argument to 
convince regulatory bodies to pay for new, expensive treatments3. 
Other directors were soon convinced of the strategic opportunities of this project for CLCCs. 
At the national level, they were well aware that it might contribute to re-establishing their 
legitimacy towards the public authorities and the French medical community. Indeed, at a 
time when concern for quality in the healthcare system was rising, CLCCs would be the 
hospitals who set the example. 
 
At the time [i.e. in 1993, at the beginning of the project], the Social Security agency was 
about to elaborate guidelines… Then, what was our usefulness if, as oncologists, we were 
not able to produce cancer guidelines? We thus decided together: ‘We will produce 
guidelines by ourselves and respect them, before we are forced to do so by someone else.’ 
(…) Furthermore, our oncologists used to say that they were the best ones. They had to 
prove it [in producing guidelines]! (Interview with a director, 2002; author’s translation) 
 
The SORs were preeminently seen by the directors as a way to set the rules in the oncology 
sector. Indeed, teaching hospitals were particularly threatening to them. From the 1980s on, 
teaching hospitals began to claim that cancer centers were not useful anymore since they had 
the same missions in the field of cancer-care. The former further argued that their physicians, 
specialized in organ treatments and at the forefront of clinical research, were more qualified to 
treat (and cure) cancer and to teach other physicians the best way to do it. In this context of 
struggle for legitimacy, guidelines were conceived by directors as a way to re-affirm the 
usefulness of CLCCs along-side these teaching hospitals. But they were also a tool to defend 
a medical approach and the organization of cancer care which CLCCs have developed (Pinell, 
2002) and are very proud of: an organization based on the participation of every medical 
specialist in the decision-making process related to a patient’s treatment strategy – also called 
a multidisciplinary approach – whereas teaching hospitals tended to promote another model, 
in which mastership of the initial decision is given to the organ specialist (and mainly to the 
surgeon). It therefore comes as no surprise that one of the first guidelines elaborated by the 
FNCLCC was entitled ‘Standards, Options and Recommendations concerning good practices 
in the multidisciplinary organization of cancer care’ (Chardot et al., 1995). 
At the regional level, the directors’ expectations were congruent with those of the project 
leader’s: they intended to use the SORs to restore the leadership of their center and to improve 
its relationships with some general (private and public) hospitals. But they also had specific 
strategic uses of the SORs depending on the local organizational context. For instance, for 
some directors who had decided to enhance collaboration with the regional teaching hospital, 
the SORs helped to initiate a dialogue between their physicians and those who worked in the 
teaching hospital. In one region, the elaboration of a common language and common 
therapeutic attitudes subsequently allowed a new division of cancer care between these two 
hospitals to be established. In other regions, the directors hoped the diffusion of guidelines 
would facilitate the treatment of common cancers by general hospitals, allowing CLCC 
physicians to concentrate upon complex tasks. On the contrary, in some regions, the SORs 
were a tool to restrict the entrance of newcomers to the sector. 
 
 
When the organization of cancer care was discussed at the regional level [with regulatory 
bodies and hospital representatives] two years ago, we had a clear idea about which 
hospitals we wanted to work with and with which we did not. We came to the discussions 
with the SORs, saying: ‘These are the best practices in oncology and we cannot sell off 
oncology. Thus, only hospitals which are able to comply with the SORs may care for 
cancer patients.’ If you refer to some rules which you do not have written down and 
which describe what has to be done, it defuses a bomb. Then, we succeeded in selling the 
ideas of a multidisciplinary organization of cancer care and a unique regional medical 
record… It is not all achieved, but… People have made headway. We may notice that 
some hospitals have given up the idea of developing oncology, others have grown bigger. 
(Interview with a vice-director of a CLCC, 2001; author’s translation) 
 
Whatever the different uses of the SORs, they all have in common that these guidelines 
represented for CLCC directors a tool to reorganizing cancer care in their regions. This was a 




As we noted above, public authorities delegated cancer guidelines to the FNCLCC and 
approved the SORs, thus reinstating CLCCs as legitimate organizations in the French 
oncology sector. Then, medical societies stepped in and became involved in the development 
of cancer guidelines. Some of them collaborated with the FNCLCC and others produced their 
own guidelines. These different attitudes were partially linked with the specific relationships 
that oncologists had developed previously with the different organ specialties. 
The medical societies which have been the most prolific producers of guidelines are 
dominated by organ specialists who traditionally intend to master the care of the 
corresponding cancers at the expense of oncologists, considering the latter as merely “sub-
contractors”. Indeed, urologists, gastroenterologists and hematologists perceived oncologists 
as competitors. For instance, urologists usually consider surgery to be the best treatment 
against localized and locally advanced prostate cancers, even if some studies concluded that 
surgery and radiotherapy were equivalent treatments in terms of overall survival. For them, 
radiotherapy must remain only an option when surgery is not possible. The respective place of 
these two treatments for prostate cancers remains a controversial issue (Hakenberg et al., 
2006). In the same vein, gastroenterologists consider themselves to be more qualified than 
oncologists to prescribe drugs for digestive cancers since they better understand the working 
of the corresponding organs and thus are able to adapt protocols to the organs’ reactions (and 
weaknesses). However, even if they more or less openly criticize the FNCLCC for trying to 
lead the development of guidelines at the national level, all these societies cannot help making 
reference to the SORs, thus attesting to their importance in the sector. 
 
It is true that there have been conflicts between oncologists and urologists. Things are 
changing leading to fewer conflicts. But this remains very much “physician-dependent”. 
(…) But there is still a problem: the FNCLCC still tends to think that cancer centers 
embody cancer care. We answer that they are only one actor amongst others. (…) The 
methodology that the French Association of Urology is using to produce guidelines is 
becoming more and more credible. We are trying to elaborate them according to the level 
of evidence, like the SORs. (Interview with a member of the board of the French 
Association of Urology, 2003; author’s translation) 
 
On the contrary, the first medical societies which accepted to participate in the SOR project 
happened to be the ones which were composed either of organ specialists who were used to 
working with oncologists and/or of many oncologists. In particular, since the 1970s, the 
 
French Society of Pediatric Oncology has been composed of physicians of cancer centers and 
teaching hospitals who have developed common research and treatment protocols (Castel & 
Dalgalarrondo, 2005). Inside the French Society of Gynecologic Oncology, gynecologists and 
oncologists have collaborated for a long time, since breast cancer is one of the first cancers, of 
which treatment has consisted in a multidisciplinary approach – combining surgery, 
radiotherapy and medical treatment – (Pickstone, 2007). 
However, even if the organization of cancer care influences the development and 
implementation of guidelines, it does not determine it. Specialists, once competitors, may 
learn how to work together around the development of guidelines. For instance, the French 
Society of Dermatology finally accepted to co-sign two guidelines with the FNCLCC, 
although they had been reluctant to for a long time. The French Federation of Digestive 
Oncology also joined the SOR project three years ago, after it had published 6 guidelines by 
itself. One hypothesis for this evolution relies on the institutionalization of the SOR project in 
the French oncology sector, so that it is difficult for an (isolated) medical society to continue 
this activity in parallel. Another hypothesis is the regulatory capacity of evidence-based 
medicine, entailing an inherent reflexivity among participants and resulting in the production 
of conventions and concerted programs of action (Cambrosio et al., 2006). 
 
Individual authority and guidelines 
 
In the French oncology sector, physicians tend to hold a good opinion of guidelines because 
of the professional issues these guidelines have addressed (Castel & Merle, 2002). On the one 
hand, they are generally considered as a tool to lessen medical uncertainty, since they may 
attenuate the difficulty to make a therapeutic decision in a context characterized by an 
increasing number of randomized controlled trials and since an error may have lethal 
consequences. On the other hand, they limit the risk of a patient’s and a manager’s mistrust 
towards the quality of medical practices. Furthermore, the fact that these guidelines are 
exclusively elaborated by professionals (including those which have been approved by public 
authorities) and that they are not used by public authorities to punish physicians, facilitate this 
acceptation. But I will argue in this section that participation in the development and 
implementation of guidelines may also be the result of an individual strategy by physicians, in 
order to increase their specialization in cancer care and their visibility in the medical 
community, and thus, to have greater control of patients’ trajectories in Strauss’ sense (1985). 
Intra-professional legitimacy is also at stake for the individual practitioner, which will 
partially explain why some become involved in the elaboration and implementation of 
guidelines, and others do not. 
 
The interests of cancer center physicians in the SOR project 
 
The SOR project would probably have failed if the physicians who directed CLCCs had not 
convinced “rank-and-file” oncologists to participate. As we saw above, nearly two thirds of 
the medical community enrolled within a few years. The CLCC physicians we interviewed 
between 1999 and 2002 criticized neither the developmental process of the SORs nor the 
quality of the final documents. To the contrary, they generally expressed pride in their 
participation. For instance, in 1995, seven inter-CLCC scientific groups, among the most 
significant ones (gynecologic tumors, breast cancers, digestive cancers, genetic oncology, 
infectious diseases in oncology, statistics, radiology), stated their participation in the SORs 
prominently in their annual report. 
Three reasons may explain this success. The first is an institutional one. On the one hand, 
CLCC physicians were aware that the oncology sector was becoming increasingly 
 
competitive and, thus, increasingly threatening for them. They believed that the SORs could 
contribute to re-establishing cancer centers as leaders in the French oncology sector. 
 
The SORs are a wonderful tool and only CLCCs are able to produce it – thanks to our 
multidisciplinary culture. We receive great credibility when we publish a SOR. (…) 
When we write such texts, we become incontestable in the sector. (Interview with a 
radiotherapist, 2000; author’s translation) 
 
On the other hand, since clinical research is tightly linked with the birth of oncology as a 
medical specialty (Cambrosio, 2005; Pickstone, 2007), CLCC physicians were more prone to 
participate in a project that claimed its insertion in the Evidence-Based Medicine movement. 
Moreover, the traditional multidisciplinary organization inside CLCCs has facilitated the 
acceptation and the organization of this project by their physicians. They were more likely to 
accept a formalized (collective and multidisciplinary) regulation of their practices. 
 
The guidelines are part of a global evolution, but this does not represent a revolution for 
us. For other hospitals, it may be a cultural revolution (…): the systematic reference to a 
document for therapeutic decision-making and the multidisciplinary organization of care 
are not innate; it requires a specific organization and structure. (Interview with a CLCC 
surgeon, 2002; author’s translation) 
 
The second reason for this success related to the management of this project, which was not 
intended to be a top-down project. On the one hand, the whole medical community was 
invited to get involved. It was not limited to opinion leaders. Furthermore, every guideline 
had to be validated by every CLCC medical committee (which is composed of all physicians 
who work inside the center) before it was published. On the other hand, reformers presented 
this project to the physicians as a way to improve their practices rather than as a coercive one 
to control them. Medical evaluations were intended to evaluate the conformity of medical 
practices with the SORs but no sanction was considered. 
Thirdly, physicians consider that the SORs help them in their daily practice. On the one hand, 
their involvement in the development and dissemination process contributes to their hyper 
specialization (and authority) on certain cancers. Indeed, belonging to a national task force 
which is responsible for a SOR enhances or consolidates a physician’s reputation in the 
treatment of the corresponding cancer (similar to publishing the results of randomized clinical 
trials in leading medical journals). In the same vein, the management of a task force at the 
regional level in order to adapt and implement the SORs contributes to the regional authority 
of this physician: not only can this physician make clear during discussions that he is well-
versed in the literature and that he is aware of the latest clinical trials but, at the same time, he 
demonstrates to his regional colleagues that he is inclined to help them – and so exhibiting a 
kind of altruism. 
 
[A medical leader] is someone who works a lot and who works well. We may evaluate 
this through his care for the patients we refer to him. But he is also someone who 
participates in task groups and in protocols. And he is someone who knows how to share 
his knowledge. The number of publications is one criterion but it is not the only one. 
What counts more is showing one’s intention of working (…) and on the way one is 
trying to be acknowledged as a leader. There is also the human touch. (Interview with an 
oncologist in a general hospital, 2003; author’s translation) 
 
On the other hand, due to a significant increase in the number of articles related to 
randomized clinical trials at the turn of the 1990s, it was difficult even for the CLCC 
physicians to be well informed on current treatments for every cancer. Most of them became 
 
specialized in certain kinds of cancers. Thus, the SORs were consulted as a resource to find 
scientific information when it came to taking care of patients who suffered from cancers of 
which they were less familiar. In particular, cancer center physicians were interested in the 
SORs for their activity of outside counseling. Indeed, when they had to give advice to peers 
on cancers in which they are not specialized, the SORs constituted a precious help. 
 
I am an oncologist, but I do not know 10% of all the decisions to take in oncology. We 
are hyper-specialized. For instance, I am specialized in prostate cancer. But when it 
departs from your hyper-specialization, it becomes very complicated. Guidelines will be 
referred to by physicians when the case departs from their specialty. (Interview with a 
radiotherapist, 2000; author’s translation) 
 
Opportunist uses of guidelines 
 
Other physicians may also perceive the strategic interest of their participation in the regional 
implementation process. Organ specialists who want to specialize in oncology or oncologists 
who work in general public or private hospitals and who have thus to be trusted by surgeons 
may choose to participate in the regional implementation of guidelines in order to acquire 
local legitimacy. Indeed, physicians have to convince their colleagues who may refer patients 
to them, that they are competent and, in particular, that they are able to prescribe the correct 
treatments. There is no available study which compares overall survival rates among different 
hospitals in France. A doctor’s reputation rests therefore on other (social) mechanisms. The 
participation in clinical research which may allow a physician to acquire a distinctive 
reputation through publications or communications is a frequently used strategy. But one may 
analyze the current development of oncology networks in France, which generally elaborate 
collegial guidelines and promote the creation of multidisciplinary (and sometimes multi-
hospitals) medical staffs in charge of making therapeutic decisions, as another medical 
response to restore medical authority. Physicians participate in the regional elaboration of 
guidelines or in multidisciplinary medical staffs to increase their knowledge, to appear 
competent when talking with their peers and to acquire a kind of quality distinction. 
A regional task group aiming at implementing the SORs allows physicians who work in 
general healthcare organizations to have privileged and personal access to the knowledge and 
experience of their academic4 counterparts. Guidelines facilitate the sharing of specialized 
knowledge, so that “rank-and-file physicians” depend less on the personal advice of their 
illustrious colleagues for the most frequent types of cancers. We may then apply Segrestin’s 
analysis of ISO norms (1996) to guidelines: indeed, the ‘logic’ of both kinds of norms 
consists of sharing knowledge which was only mastered by experts before. 
 
If someone wants to practice traditional surgery, [the work on guidelines] is not that 
important. But if someone wants to specialize in oncology, then… It is changing so fast! 
Nobody is able to attend all scientific meetings; nobody is able to read the whole 
published literature. (…) If someone wants to “hyperspecialize”, he has to know up-to-
date treatments and nobody can do it on their own. (Interview with a private surgeon, 
2003; author’s translation) 
 
This participation is a resource for physicians in their efforts to gain greater control over the 
management of patient “trajectories” in both Strauss’ senses (Strauss et al., 1985): trajectory 
of illness and organization of medical work. This allows them to intervene more in the work 
of their colleagues. 
First, they may acquire a greater legitimacy over physicians who have not specialized in 
oncology. Some find this label useful in convincing their patients and peers (general 
 
practitioners, surgeons, diagnostic physicians…), who may assign patients to them, that they 
are as competent as, say, academic physicians. Their authority relies then more on local, 
collective norms rather than on their individual competence. Indeed, some of their non-
specialized counterparts reported more trust (and thus refer more frequently) to those of their 
peers who participated in this collective process. We may thus understand why only 
oncologists and organ specialists who want to specialize in oncology participate in such 
networks. On the opposite, organ specialists (gastroenterologists, surgeons, etc.) for whom 
cancer patients do not represent a major part of their activity do not get involved in networks. 
 
The network is useful to attest my competencies. I decided to adhere to it as soon as it 
began. (…) Surgeons, when they send me a patient, know that some regional standards 
exist. Thus, I am writing in the medical record: ‘standard of [the regional network]’. It 
legitimizes my decision. They know that every patient is treated in the same way. 
(Interview with a medical oncologist, 2003; author’s translation) 
 
Secondly, during task group discussions, they have the opportunity to hinder the academic 
physicians’ monopoly over cancer care. The first social mechanism is negotiation, as 
Timmermans and Berg showed before (2003): they negotiate with academic physicians so 
that guidelines do not stipulate treatments that are too complex and that cannot be prescribed 
by general facilities (e.g. clinical trials, intensive chemotherapies, up-to-date diagnostic 
exams…). The second mechanism is trust: during discussions, they get a chance to convince 
their (specialized) colleagues that they are competent and may even demonstrate some 
expertise. Indeed, some academic physicians that were interviewed recognized that before this 
process, they tended to mistrust their colleagues who worked in general healthcare 
organizations, believing that they were not competent enough. Nowadays, they have changed 
their mind. As a result, academic physicians are more prone to let these physicians take care 
of patients who suffer “standard” cancers (such as colon cancer, breast cancer…) or even to 
re-assign those patients to them. 
 
This allowed me to meet some physicians who worked in general hospitals and whom I 
had not known before. It helped me to avoid certain prejudices. In the medical world, it is 
terrible how fast we label people! ‘The private sector does not think anything but money!’ 
‘The public sector does not do anything at all!’ But, when we came to know each other, 
we realized that people share a common interest: the patient! And we also realized that 
everybody worked hard. (Interview with an academic lung specialist, responsible for a 
regional task group, 2003; author’s translation) 
 
Last but not least, guidelines constitute a robust argument for physicians, so that they may try 
to restrict the autonomy of their peers and to influence the management of patients. For 
instance, during multidisciplinary staff meetings, physicians may argue that a therapeutic 
decision is not ‘evidence-based’ and thus try to change it, even if this patient is not under their 
responsibility. Physicians who want to propose a “non-conform” treatment have to justify it. 
Another example relied in the changing relationships between surgeons and radiotherapists in 
a region where protocols had been broadly diffused. Surgeons grumbled about the growing 
interference of radiotherapists in their autonomy. Indeed, radiotherapists dared to ask them to 
perform a new operation when surgical margins were insufficient related to the diffused 
guidelines. A last frequent example relied in the relationships between diagnostic specialists 
and clinicians: the latter were more prone to use guidelines to frame their colleagues’ activity 
in terms of delay and quality of their exams reports. 
 
 
[The regional protocols] make clear that I am not maniac or obsessional when I am asking 
them for some quality criteria: these criteria are written in the guidelines! For example, I 
must have exams’ results in pathology or in radiology fifteen days later. As for 
pathologists, when we ask them to write some details, it is not because we are maniacs, it 
is only because it has to be that way. (Interview with a private surgeon, 2003; author’s 
translation) 
 
Of course, this does not mean that physicians are compelled to obey their colleagues if they 
rely on guidelines. Other types of authority still exist in the sector. For example, physicians 
may invoke the uniqueness of every therapeutic relationship to adapt a protocol. And 
authority of academic physicians may still rely on charisma or personal prestige. Indeed, some 
academic physicians refuse to participate in networks which implement guidelines. They 
would rather organize frequent meetings when they give personal advice on specific cases 
which are brought by non-specialized physicians. Nonetheless, our observations made clear 
that rational-legal authority (Weber, 1922) is becoming dominant in the French oncology 
sector. Physicians who are able to justify therapeutic decisions and advice thanks to these 
guidelines and, more broadly, to the medical literature, are becoming more and more 
legitimate among their peers. Furthermore, guidelines facilitate an increasing ‘lateral control 
regime’ (Lazega, 2000) among physicians. Contrary to previous periods when analysts 
noticed that physicians had limited opportunities to meet and to evaluate each other (Freidson 
& Rhea, 1963; 1965), guidelines represent a device which increases interdependency among 




Medical standardization may not only alter relationship dynamics between physicians and 
non-physicians (specifically patients, hospital managers and regulatory bodies), but it may 
also alter relationships between physicians themselves. In line with Timmermans and Berg 
(2003) and Cambrosio and colleagues (2006), this case study shows that standardization 
implies an increase of relationships among physicians (through task groups, for instance) and 
the development of shared conventions, which facilitate these inter-personal exchanges. As it 
is in the industrial sector (Segrestin, 1997; Cochoy et al., 1998; Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000), 
standardization in the medical field allows for an improvement of relationships between 
actors through mechanisms of collective learning. 
The study of standardization in the sector of French oncology shows also that it is heuristic to 
take political considerations into account when studying the development of standardized 
guidelines. This conclusion appears to be congruent with some of those of Timmermans and 
Berg (2003) who proposed “a study of the politics of standardization in practice”. However, 
their conception of power differs from the one used in this paper. Although they did not 
explicitly set forth a definition of power, their analyzes and reference to The Birth of the 
Clinic by Foucault (1973) underlay a substantive and abstract conception of power. In the 
cases they studied, standards either embodied institutionalized power relationships (which 
impeded the establishment of standards, like in the “CPR” case) or they changed the dynamics 
of these relationships; however, the authors did not analyze why either happened as it did. 
By contrast, the sociology of organization, to which I refer, considers an interactive and 
strategic concept of power, which is a basic ingredient of exchange relations between actors 
placed in a context of strategic interdependence (Crozier, 1965; Chazel, 1992; Boudon & 
Bourricaud, 1982). Power can be conceptualized as the unequal and negotiated exchange of 
capacities of action in which every actor looks to simultaneously constrain other members of 
an organization in order to satisfy expectations and avoid being constrained by other members 
(Crozier & Friedberg, 1980; Friedberg, 1997). Strategy and resources are, therefore, two key 
 
ideas related to this concept of power. In the case of French oncology, I established that 
standards could indeed be strategic resources used by professional actors at the expense of 
other professionals to improve their position in regards to the following two issues: 1) 
maintaining a sufficient volume of activity and 2) increasing control over therapeutic 
decisions. CLCCs and cancer center physicians were the ones who benefited the most from 
these standards. But, in this theoretical perspective, even actors placed in a favorable situation 
could not eliminate the capacity of other actors to resist. This explains why negotiations took 
place at every level of analysis: national, regional and local. The perspective of the sociology 
of organization, which places concrete exchange and bargaining relations at the core of its 
analysis and in which social control is continually challenged and (re)produced, helps to 
identify other reasons why, as well-illustrated by STS studies (Timmermans & Berg, 1997; 
Zuiderent-Jerak, 2007), standardization does not prevent local specificities and variations but 




                                                 
1 These guidelines are called ‘Standards, Options and Recommendations’ (SOR) since they are classified in three 
categories. A clinical attitude is called a ‘Standard’ when there is unanimity concerning its benefits, its 
inappropriateness or its potential danger. It is called an ‘Option’ when a majority of physicians agrees with the 
benefits, inappropriateness or dangers of a specific attitude. ‘Recommendations’ represent a choice by experts 
among different options. Each category is then explicated by a level of evidence, depending on the available 
scientific. 
2 This corresponds to medical societies who participated in only one guideline: French Sarcoma Group, French-
speaking Society of Enteral Nutrition, French Society of Pathology, French Association of Urology, French-
speaking Society of Brain-surgery, French Society of Nuclear Medicine. 
3 In the same vein, Berg and colleagues (2000) showed that guidelines had been a tool for insurance physicians 
in the Netherlands to restore the legitimacy of their practices, which were criticized by non-physicians. 
4 By “academic physician”, I mean physicians who work in hospitals whose missions are research and teaching, 
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